

6 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Mr. McCone on  
6 November 1964

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1. Mr. McCone advised me that, as a result of the message  
[redacted] called Secretary Rusk and asked that he wire  
that Mr. McCone would rather wait until later  
to do his European briefing of De Gaulle, if this is possible.

2. I told Mr. McCone that the Department of Defense thinks  
it a poor idea for Senator Young to go to Saigon. Mr. McCone  
said that when he had talked with Senator Young earlier, he had  
told the senator he did not think he should go to Saigon. The DCI  
said he would like to see a copy of Senator Young's itinerary. *(Warner  
was advised of this and advised Sen. Young against going to Saigon.)*

3. I told the DCI that I had spoken with Mac Bundy and  
Secretary Vance regarding U-2 reconnaissance of Cuba and that  
there was no idea of a stand-down in their minds. I said I had a  
call in to Secretary Rusk to check with him also, but that I had  
thus far been unable to speak with him. *(I subsequently talked  
with Mr. Rusk, who agreed there was no standdown.)*

4. I told Mr. McCone that we had ~~plenty~~ <sup>several</sup> of clearances for  
TACKLE flights and that we were going ahead with them. He  
stated that in view of the lack of reaction to the last mission, he  
wished serious consideration be given to going in from the south,  
following exactly the same pattern we followed the last time. He  
added that the most important thing for us to do is to have a  
success with the new equipment as quickly as possible.

5. I advised the DCI that no final decisions had been reached  
as a result of the meetings of the <sup>EXACT</sup> vulnerability panel, and that  
DOD has chosen to withdraw from it entirely. I said I was having  
a memo prepared on this.

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- 2 -

6. Mr. McCone asked that we give serious consideration to ~~turning over to DOD~~ the study done by Mr. Kirkpatrick and his staff on turning OXCART over to the Air Force. I said that our budget people have prepared a paper on this subject which says, among other things, that it would be a good idea for the turnover to be before the end of the fiscal year -- but that the main point is, "Has anyone made the crunch decision *about using it*" Mr. McCone said that if the decision is made to turn over the OXCART to the Air Force, there is nothing sacred about doing it prior to the end of the fiscal year. Mr. McCone said it is necessary that we have a very definite, precise, policy judgment at the top, with a directive in the form of an NSAM.

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7. I mentioned that Bill Bundy was heading up a task force on Vietnam and has asked CIA for some papers to be ready tonight which will be sent to President Johnson at Johnson City -- these papers will be labeled as think pieces at the staff level which have no approval from "higher up," and will reflect courses of action to be taken. Mr. McCone said he would like to see these papers. He also mentioned that when he went to President Hoover's funeral, the President had asked him what he thought of the situation in Vietnam -- that he had replied his opinion was that there was no chance of accomplishing our objectives unless we extended our actions and that anything short of that would be just a continuation of the situation we are in now which is eroding away by degrees. I replied that this was our position and also that of the JCS.

Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Acting Director

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carter

Attached is my stab at a memo for the record of your conversation with the DCI today. Mr. Knoche made some corrections and additions and gave a copy to Mr. Elder. He said there was to be no further distribution.

OK -

Barbara (6 Nov)

(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101  
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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